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 At this moment in history, the scale of forced migration has reached unprecedented 
levels. Due to the increase in civil wars and repressive regimes, the global population of people 
forcibly displaced from their homes has grown from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 
2016, a record high (UNHCR 2016, 5). The current crisis in Syria has dramatically added to the 
number of forced migrants in recent years and has brought the “refugee1 crisis” center stage as 
one of the most urgent international concerns today. While many have discussed international 
attempts to address the structural causes of forced migration, those causes are unlikely to be 
resolved soon. The refugee crisis is a long-term trend rather than a temporary phenomenon, 
because the number of chronically fragile states is growing, while opportunities for mobility are 
increasing (Betts 2015). Therefore, it is imperative to address the consequence of those structural 
problems—the millions displaced and in need of protection.  
This paper will zero in on one demonstrative example of the current international policy 
response to refugee protection in Europe—the recent EU-Turkey deal and its shortcomings as a 
solution to the crisis. While the deal is successful at reducing the number of  irregular arrivals to 
the EU, it fails at its legal and ethical obligation to protect refugees. The deal fails to protect 
because its underlying objective is not protection, but rather border control via “burden-shifting,” 
the transferring of responsibility onto other states. By outsourcing the refugee crisis to Turkey 
and forcing Greece to deal with refugees alone as the rest of the EU closes their borders, 
protection has deteriorated. As a result of the deal, refugees are crowded into under-resourced 
detention centers with unsafe conditions. In addition, the deal could hurt the European economy 
and threaten international security. 
This paper will examine: (1) the terms of the EU-Turkey deal, (2) the humanitarian, 
economic, and global security consequences of its burden-shifting approach, (3) and the flawed 
legal framework, national interests, and short-sighted conceptualization of the crisis that beget 
burden-shifting. Finally, this paper will propose tradable refugee quotas with a matching 
mechanism as a possible policy solution for the EU sharing its responsibility to protect refugees. 
 
                                                
1 The term “refugee” is used broadly to refer to a person forcibly displaced from their home 
country seeking protection from a range of causes such as authoritarian regimes, conflict, human 
rights violations, environmental disasters, and state collapse. 
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The EU-Turkey Deal 
The EU-Turkey deal targets the flow of asylum-seekers traveling from Turkey to Europe 
through Greece. According to the European Commission, “in 2015 alone, more than one million 
people arrived in the EU, around 885,000 of them through Greece” (EC 2017, 1).  
Many asylum-seekers risk their lives crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece in order to 
claim asylum in the EU. For instance, in December 2015 over 5,000 people made this journey 
each day (EC 2017, 2). The journey is dangerous; 1,145 asylum-seekers died in the Aegean in 
2015 (EC 2017, 2). Once in Greece, only a few of the thousands of people who arrived daily 
registered for asylum there, while the vast majority of migrants and asylum seekers moved on 
towards central Europe (EC 2017, 1). This secondary movement occurs because Greece is 
usually not a first choice for refugees due to its already overwhelmed system for receiving 
refugees and limited economic opportunities. As a result, many prefer to pass through Greece to 
enter the rest of Europe and apply for protection there (Collett 2016). This secondary movement 
is technically illegal because asylum seekers are supposed to apply for asylum in the first country 
that they arrive in once in the EU. 
The stated purpose of the EU-Turkey deal of April 2016 was threefold: “reducing both 
the number of persons arriving irregularly to the EU and the loss of life in the Aegean whilst 
providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in need” (EC 2017, 4). The terms of the EU-
Turkey deal allow Greece to return all “irregular migrants” to Turkey (EU-Turkey statement 
2016). Irregular migrants include those who do not apply or do not qualify for asylum, as well as 
those who apply for asylum but have arrived from a safe country where they could have claimed 
protection (Collett 2016). Turkey, the country most refugees pass through to get to Greece, is 
being designated a safe country under the terms of the deal (Collett 2016). This is the first time 
that the EU has adopted a policy of returning asylum seekers because they have passed through a 
“safe country” outside the EU. Because the deal defines Turkey as a safe country, all incoming 
asylum-seekers arriving in Greece from Turkey are eligible for deportation. Turkey also pledged 
to crack down on smugglers illegally transporting refugees to Greece (EU-Turkey statement 
2016). In exchange, the EU pledged to resettle one Syrian refugee residing in Turkey for every 
Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece; accelerate making Turkey a member of the EU through 
visa liberation for Turkish nationals; and boost financial support for Turkey’s refugees (EU-
Turkey statement 2016). In effect, the deal shifts the burden of the EU’s migrant flows onto 
Greece and Turkey to stop secondary movement, dissuade refugees from coming to Greece in 
the first place, and essentially close its borders. 
Based on the deal’s own stated objectives, it could be called a success. The deal 
accomplished the stated goal of reducing the number of irregular arrivals to the EU. The number 
of arrivals dropped by 97% immediately after the deal was enacted, from 5,005 people daily in 
December 2015 to 43 people daily in March 2016 (EC 2017, 2). Furthermore, the deal achieved 
the stated goal of reducing the “the loss of life in the Aegean,” as the number of deaths in the 
Aegean decreased from 1,145 in the year before the statement to 80 in the year which followed 
(EC 2017, 2). Finally, the stated goal of “providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in 
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 need” could be considered successful if one’s definition of “those in need” excludes all irregular 
migrants coming from Turkey. Indeed, the EU Commission reports that the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey deal has been a success (EC 2017, 1). 
 However, success depends on how the results are defined. While the deal is successful 
based on the EU’s own objectives, the deal is a failure in terms of the EU’s ethical and legal 
commitment to refugee protection. By focusing on burden-shifting and deterrence rather than 
focusing on protection, the results of the deal are a humanitarian failure. 
In Greece, the deal has shifted the responsibility of reception in the EU onto Greece, a 
country that already received the majority of refugees coming to the EU—around 885,000 out of 
one million EU arrivals in 2015 (EC 2017, 1). While the deal has decreased the number of 
arrivals in Greece overall, the deal has actually caused the number of arrivals registering for 
asylum there to increase. Before the deal, only a few thousand arrivals actually stayed in  
Greece and applied for asylum there; most traveled on to wealthier countries in the EU (EC 
2017, 1). After the deal, blocked entry to the rest of Europe transformed Greece overnight from a 
passageway to the final destination, as asylum seekers are left with no option but to apply for 
protection in Greece. As a result, Greece has become overwhelmed by the enormously increased 
task of processing claims, holding refugees in camps while they wait, and granting asylum 
(Collett 2016). It may seem like the burden would not be so substantial because Greece can 
return the asylum-seekers to Turkey. Yet, in practice Greece can return only a limited number of 
migrants because it cannot process asylum claims quickly in its overwhelmed system, and other 
EU states are reluctant to assist (Collett 2016). With Greece’s system so overburdened, the deal 
has deteriorated protection for refugees in Greece. Thousands of refugees are living in 
challenging conditions, often without basic needs met, while waiting for Greece’s overloaded 
system to process their asylum applications or return them to Turkey (Gogou 2017). Amnesty 
International reports: 
On the Greek islands the harrowing human cost of the deal is laid bare. Not 
allowed to leave, thousands of asylum-seekers live in a tortuous limbo. Women, 
men and children languish in inhumane conditions, sleeping in flimsy tents, 
braving the snow and are sometimes the victims of violent hate crimes. Five 
refugees on Lesvos, including a child, have died amid such conditions. After the 
deaths of three men in Moria camp in January 2017, one man living there told 
Amnesty International: “This is a grave for humans. It is hell.” Another 20-year-
old Syrian refugee said: “I escaped Syria to avoid jail but now I am imprisoned” 
(Gogou 2017). 
 
These conditions do not meet the standards of protection under the guidelines set forth by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that include access to adequate 
living standards, work, education, health care, and access to a secure legal status (Dimitriadi 
2016, 5). 
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Meanwhile, the EU has also shifted its responsibility to protect by returning refugees to 
Turkey, at a significant humanitarian cost. Turkey had already been overloaded with refugees, 
even more so than Greece, due to its closer proximity to refugee countries of origin; quarantining 
refugees in Turkey merely increases that burden. Yet, the EU-Turkey deal deflects the 
responsibility of Europe—one of the wealthiest continents in the world—to Turkey, a country 
already hosting 3 million refugees. Thus, the deal strains the resources of an already strained 
system. This is especially troubling given that Turkey’s designation as a “safe third country” is 
dubious. First, Turkey’s authoritarian drift could mean that the nation will “place greater weight 
on securing financial assistance or political backing from rich donor countries, than on 
responding to local grievances about the presence of refugees” (Boswell 2003). Therefore, 
societal tensions could be exacerbated and not adequately addressed, which could threaten 
refugee safety and assimilation. Second, Turkey has tightened its borders and returned refugees 
back to Syria, in direct violation of international law that establishes that refugees cannot 
forcibly be returned to their countries of origin (Amnesty International 2016). Third, reports 
indicate that conditions at Turkey’s refugee camps fail to provide basic human services such as 
clean water, emergency medical services, and protection from dangers such as kidnappings 
(Amnesty International 2016). It is estimated that about 3 million asylum seekers and refugees in 
Turkey are left to find shelter on their own (Dimitriadi 2016, 5). As with Greece, these 
conditions contrast with the UNHCR standards of protection. Thus, Turkey is not a safe country 
for refugees. 
Besides the immediate humanitarian costs, deteriorated protection in Greece and Turkey 
due to burden-shifting under the deal could exacerbate the structural conditions that  
force refugees to flee in the first place. In the long term, refugees fleeing from conflict-torn states 
like Syria can play a critical role in rebuilding their countries of origin after the fighting is over 
(Betts 2016). For refugees to rebuild, they need to be alive, healthy, educated, and able to work. 
Yet the  deal fails to provide even basic needs, let alone access to education or work. As a result, 
the deal inhibits reconstruction in refugee-producing countries, which is needed to address the 
cause of displacement in the first place. 
Finally, the record level of burden-shifting in this deal could set a disturbing precedent of 
wealthy countries closing their borders and outsourcing responsibility to refugees onto other, less 
safe countries. Indeed, some argue that the deal tells developing countries that “their cooperation 
on migration is a commodity that is rapidly increasing in value,” while it tells developed 
countries that their responsibilities to refugees are optional (Alfred 2016). The ripple effects are 
already visible, as European leaders are now calling for similar deals with countries in North 
Africa (Alfred 2016). For example, the EU is looking to replicate a similar deal with Libya, “a 
country where both the United Nations (UN) and the German Foreign Ministry have reported 
torture and execution in migrant camps” (Lovett, Whelan, and Rendón 2017). 
The humanitarian costs to the EU burden-shifting its responsibility to protect render the 
EU-Turkey deal a failure on legal and ethical grounds. Legally, such burden-shifting 
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erodes the international legal standards enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As per the 
convention, refugees have a right to seek asylum, have their individual claims examined, and, by 
the principle of non-refoulement, to not be forcibly returned to their countries of origin. 
However, the EU-Turkey deal prevents asylum seekers from seeking refugee status in the EU—
which they have a right to under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The result is that asylum-seekers 
in Greece and Turkey do not have access to the adequate living standards, appropriate 
accommodation, and services they are entitled to under UNHCR standards of protection 
(Dimitriadi 2016, 5). Thus, the EU-Turkey deal is a failure because it legally and ethically 
violates the EU’s humanitarian responsibility towards individuals seeking international 
protection.  
Some may argue that the EU-Turkey deal is not a failure because its objectives of saving 
lives at sea and providing safe routes to the EU for those in need are humanitarian; however, this 
claim is invalid because the actual humanitarian effects of those objectives are dubious. While 
there are fewer deaths in the Aegean Sea, it is questionable that more lives are being saved 
overall. In addition, there are not enough safe routes to the EU being provided for those in need.  
First, the objective of saving lives at sea must be understood within the larger context of 
the refugee crisis. Although the number of people taking the dangerous route across the Aegean 
Sea has decreased, the number of people in need of asylum has not—the people in need have not 
disappeared. Instead, the refugees who would have crossed the Aegean are now either still inside 
their own war-torn countries, resigned to fleeing to countries in the Middle East like Turkey and 
Jordan who are already hosting a significant refugee population, or taking different, more 
dangerous routes to the EU as a result of the blocked Aegean route. Thus, while it is true that the 
number of lives lost in the Aegean Sea has decreased, many of the would-be Aegean crossers’ 
lives are likely still at risk—just elsewhere. It is impossible to track how many asylum-seekers 
are now trying alternate, more dangerous routes to the EU, but it is certain that some people will 
always try to make their way into the EU as long as it offers the promise of a better life. Thus, it 
is unclear whether the reduction of deaths in the Aegean has actually saved more lives overall. 
More importantly, the focus on the deaths prevented in the Aegean Sea diverts attention from the 
deal’s failure to protect refugees and ensure quality protection.  
Second, it is not clear that the deal does anything to provide safe routes to the EU for 
those in need, other than allowing Syrian refugees in Turkey to resettle in the EU per the 1:1 
agreement. Yet, that policy discriminates one nationality over others, and to date only 9,383 
Syrian refugees have been resettled—a pitiful number compared to the need (EC 2017, 3). 
Moreover, the objective of “providing safe and legal routes to the EU for those in need” excludes 
irregularly arriving asylum-seekers coming from Turkey, who are now eligible to be returned to 
Turkey. That exclusion is unacceptable, because many of those asylum-seekers are in need of 
protection—protection that Turkey cannot adequately provide. 
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Thus, while the EU-Turkey deal is successful based on its own objectives, those 
objectives are problematic. Evaluating the deal based on the legal and ethical responsibility to 
protect refugees reveals a far more harrowing outcome. The deal is a failure because burden-
shifting has resulted in an erosion of the EU’s ethical and legal responsibility to protect refugees, 
at a humanitarian cost evidenced by the reality on the ground.  
 The humanitarian consequences are enough reason to deem the deal a failure. However, 
beyond humanitarian reasons, there are also grounds to question the prudence of the deal based 
on its potential economic and collective security consequences. The deal could exacerbate the 
ongoing economic crisis in Greece and by extension the EU’s integrated economy. While the EU 
is providing some financial support to Greece to help with reception, Greece still bears an undue 
burden for the direct and indirect costs of receiving asylum-seekers. One example of indirect 
costs is tourism. Due to the accumulation of irregular migrants in Greece as claims are processed 
now that entry to the rest of Europe is blocked, tourism dropped 80 percent on some Greek 
islands such as Lesvos in 2016 (Dimitriadi 2016, 8). The loss of tourism is a significant blow to 
the Greek economy, especially while the country is in the middle of an economic crisis. 
In addition, the deal could pose a threat to global security. Before the deal, Turkey 
already had a refugee population of 3 million; the deal increased that number even more. 
Especially in wake of the recent coup in Turkey on June 15, 2016, this burden could disrupt 
international security (Betts and Loescher 2011, 17); when “large numbers of refugees 
arereceived in areas of acute poverty or escalating civil conflict, the effects can be highly 
destabilizing” (Boswell 2003). Refugees can be destabilizing due to social tensions. As 
mentioned previously, Turkey’s authoritarian drift makes it less likely to respond to and mitigate 
social conflicts between local and refugee populations. The tensions that arise could be 
“explosive” (Boswell 2003). Refugees can also be destabilizing due to the economic strain it puts 
on already poverty-stricken areas. The destabilizing effect of more refugees in Turkey could be 
mitigated with the EU’s promised refugee aid and one for one resettlement exchange. However, 
the EU has been slow to follow through with these promises after the coup (Yeginsu 2016). 
Thus, the burden-shifting in the EU-Turkey deal deteriorates protection for refugees and 
could destabilize the EU economy and global security. These consequences could be further 
amplified in significance if the EU-Turkey deal sets a precedent. 
 
Causes of Burden-shifting 
 The humanitarian, economic, and global security costs of burden-shifting are clear. Yet, 
to provide a solution that shares rather than shifts the EU’s responsibility to refugees, it is 
necessary to understand the reasons for burden-shifting in the first place. This paper identifies 
three main causes of burden-sharing failure on international, national, and individual levels. 
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On an international level, the current weak legal basis for international cooperation 
helped to enable the burden-shifting approach to the EU-Turkey deal. The 1990 Dublin 
regulation established that the country where a refugee first enters the EU is responsible for 
processing their asylum request and granting them asylum if eligible (Fratzke 2015, 1). This puts 
an unequal burden on front-line states closest to refugee countries of origin, such as Greece, who 
must process and grant asylum to the bulk of refugees entering the EU. Also, the EU’s burden-
sharing initiatives for the physical relocation of refugees are all based on voluntary pledging 
(Thielemann 2012, 819). In summary, there is little legal basis for equitable international burden-
sharing for refugees in the EU. 
 On a national level, another cause of burden-sharing failure is the prioritization of 
strategic national interests. Accepting refugees comes at economic, social, and political costs. 
Economically, states are concerned about resettling refugees because of the “direct costs of 
subsistence, schooling, healthcare, [and] the determining process” (Thielemann 2003, 227). The 
resources required are substantial; for example, Britain spends about 30,000 euros per asylum 
seeker, while current policies under the European Refugee Fund only refund a fraction of that 
cost (Thielemann 2006, 20). Socially, states are concerned about the “more indirect costs of 
social integration” (Thielemann 2003, 227). States reason that foreign asylum-seekers create 
social tensions, especially within the relatively homogenous populations of most EU member 
states (Buonanno and Nugent 2013, 34). This social tension creates political tensions. Indeed, 
refugees have caused huge levels of political unrest among native populations in France, Britain, 
and Germany, and can be considered a potential cause  
of the rise in populist sentiments in Europe today. Therefore, negative public opinion makes 
policymakers reticent to sharing the burden of physical relocation of refugees. Refugee 
immigration is never popular among domestic populations, as voters tend to overestimate the 
chance that they will become victims of small but highly publicized risks, such as terrorist 
attacks. Across Europe, about 50 percent believe that refugees are a major threat and will 
increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Stokes 2016). One needs to look no further 
than the anti-immigration rhetoric that fueled Brexit debates (De Freytas-Tamura 2016) and the 
campaign of Marine Le Pen in the French election to recognize the political obstacles of granting 
asylum. Especially after Brexit, it has become clear that there is more at stake than popularity if 
policymakers in the EU do not take the anti-immigration sentiment of the public seriously; the 
EU could collapse if more refugees are accepted.  
 Finally, examining the state-level rationale for evading responsibility reveals another 
layer of causation for burden-shifting: a shortsighted conceptualization of the refugee crisis on 
the individual level. EU policymakers who created the EU-Turkey deal conceptualized the 
refugee influx as a zero-sum issue, in which benefitting refugees incurs inevitable costs. This 
implicit assumption of EU policymakers is evident in the terms of the EU-Turkey deal, which 
focuses on preventing irregular migrants from ever reaching the EU. However, if EU 
policymakers conceptualize refugee flows as a permanent, enduring reality, they might consider 
that closing borders will not reduce migration flows in the long run and the refugee influx may 
be positive for the European economy and society over time. 
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In conceptualizing refugee flows as a temporary phenomenon rather a long-term problem, 
EU policymakers failed to recognize that closing borders will not reduce migration flows in the 
long run. The causes of refugee migration are deep structural problems like civil wars, repressive 
regimes, and environmental disasters—none of which are likely to disappear soon. Even current 
crises like the conflict in Syria may take years to end, and, in the longer-term, new crises will 
come to take Syria’s place. In reality, increased mobility due to globalization and likely 
increased displacement due to climate change suggest that forced migration will only increase 
(Betts 2015). Meanwhile, the stability and quality of protection in Europe will always be a draw 
for refugees. When one route closes, those who are desperate enough will find another way in. 
Thus, closing borders is shortsighted because it only redirects the migration flows temporarily, 
but does not stop them in the long run. 
Moreover, the desire to stop refugees from entering the EU is also shortsighted because 
refugees could actually benefit the EU in the long term. While states face the short and medium-
term costs of providing immediate basic needs to refugees, processing asylum applications, and 
integrating refugees socially and economically, studies show that the refugee influx may be 
positive for the European economy and society in the long run (Karakas 2015, 2-3). In particular, 
refugees can contribute to GDP growth as workers who can “fill important niches both in fast-
growing and declining sectors of the economy” (Karakas 2015, 2-3) and make up for Europe’s 
aging population (Karakas 2015, 5). This economic benefit could address the current economic 
uncertainty within the EU due to the zone’s poor recovery from the disruption of the financial 
crash, the debt crisis in Greece, and the Brexit movement (McRae 2016). EU policymakers’ 
decision to burden-shift is myopic because while hosting refugees comes as a cost, it is an 
investment that could benefit the nation’s economy in the long run. 
In short, burden-shifting is caused by a flawed international framework, national self-
interest, and individual shortsightedness of the issue. 
 
Solution: The Case for Burden-sharing 
To improve burden-sharing refugee relocation within the EU and its humanitarian 
consequences, this paper recommends that policy solutions address the flawed international 
framework, state self-interest, and individual shortsightedness detailed above. One promising 
approach is a market-based strategy. Market-based strategies take account of economic and 
political incentives rather than just moral obligation—which states often do not respond to when 
that obligation conflicts with national self-interest.  
One market-based solution for burden-sharing the resettlement of refugees is a tradable 
refugee quota system coupled with a matching mechanism. Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga and 
Hillel Rapoport are two scholars that have advocated a similar plan (Moraga and Rapoport 2014, 
94-108). A tradable refugee quota system would designate each member of the EU a certain 
quota of refugees to resettle. However, these quotas are tradable with other countries on a 
refugee quota market, similar to a cap and trade system. States who wish to settle fewer refugees 
than their quotas require will have to pay other states to take their undesired quotas, thereby 
compensating for that additional burden. As a result, tradable refugee quotas would exploit 
countries’ comparative advantages in hosting refugees efficiently. This system would be coupled  
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with a matching mechanism to further maximize state interests. With a refugee matching system, 
legal routes to sanctuary in EU states would be available through humanitarian visas from 
embassies in countries like Greece and Turkey. Asylum-seekers who demonstrate a legitimate 
need can collect a humanitarian visa that allows them to pay for their own travel to an EU 
member state where they will finish their asylum application. A computer program would match 
asylum-seekers with humanitarian visas to EU member-state destinations based on both 
preferences (Betts 2016). The matchmaking scheme would protect refugees from undertaking 
dangerous journeys via smugglers and require other states to share the responsibility of granting 
and processing asylum.  
This policy of tradable refugee quotas with a matching mechanism tackles the causes of 
burden-shifting. National self-interest is addressed because the tradable quota system gives states 
incentives to resettle refugees and costs for not resettling them. In other words, states that accept 
additional refugees are compensated, while states that accept fewer refugees foot the bill. This 
policy also incentivizes states to host refugees because they can rank their refugee preferences—
for example, by language, job skills, family reunification, etc. 
This could be an economic as well as a political incentive, because states can choose refugees 
that will most benefit their economy and be welcomed into their society. In addition, this policy 
addresses individual-level shortsightedness because the refugee preference system helps 
policymakers to consider the long-term economic benefits the state will gain from investing in a 
refugee. Finally, the policy addresses the flawed international framework because the policy 
would require a certain number of refugees to be resettled, unlike the voluntary pledging system 
in place today. Even as quotas are traded, the overall number of refugees resettled would be the 
same. The current flaw in the international legal framework of frontline states carrying most of 
the refugee burden is also mitigated because of the criteria for which states are responsible now 
depends on the quota system and matching mechanism. Thus, the legal framework of this policy 
would enforce burden-sharing.  
There are many details that need to be solidified before such a policy could be 
implemented. However, this proposal is, at the very least, useful as an example of how to 
approach the burden-sharing failure of refugees in the EU in a way that addresses the causes of 
burden-shifting. A tradable refugee quota system along with a matching mechanism thus offers a 
potential solution for the EU sharing the responsibility of hosting refugees. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that this policy will be impossible to enact 
without overcoming the political obstacles against refugee relocation. This policy addresses the 
economic interests of states, but is weaker in addressing their political motives in terms of the 
negative public opinion against hosting refugees. While an extended discussion of overcoming 
public hostility against refugees is beyond the scope of this paper, this paper has highlighted two 
possible tactics for changing public opinion. From a strategic perspective, policymakers could 
convince the public that hosting refugees has a “weak but positive” (Betts 2016) economic effect 
in the long run and that granting asylum to refugees could decrease their chances of 
radicalization into terrorists (Barnes-Dacey 2016). From a humanitarian perspective, 
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 policymakers could communicate the refugees’ suffering to appeal to the public’s conscience. 
Whatever arguments policymakers make to persuade public opinion, what is important is that 
they make an argument at all, rather than letting the public’s largely unfounded fears prevent 
refugees from safety. 
 The EU-Turkey deal is a failure in terms of the EU’s ethical and legal commitment to 
refugee protection. By putting an undue burden on Greece and Turkey, the deal incurs 
humanitarian costs, as well as consequences for the EU economy and international security. The 
flawed international legal framework, prioritization of national interests, and myopic 
conceptualization of the crisis cause states to burden-shift their responsibility to provide refuge. 
The enduring character of refugee flows demands that the EU creates comprehensive, long-term 
solutions to address the continuing influx of refugees, for socioeconomic, security-related, and 
moral reasons. This paper recommends that the EU improve upon sharing its responsibility to 
protect refugees through market-based policies such as tradable refugee quotas with a matching 
mechanism. Refugees have the right to seek asylum. In reality, the EU-Turkey deal prevents 
refugees from reaching safety. Refugees have the right to start a new life in a new country where 
they are safe. In reality, they are left in an almost indefinite state of uncertainty waiting in 
detention centers in Greece or stranded in Turkey. States claim they share the responsibility of 
welcoming refugees into the safety within their borders. In reality, countries like Greece and 
Turkey that are already strained and under-resourced are taking in the majority of the refugees, 
while wealthy countries within the EU are closing their borders. With 51 million people 
displaced from their homes today and no end to the crisis in sight, the need to transform the 
reality refugees face is urgent. Closing the borders is not an option. 
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